On Hamas

[I know there are a bunch of new people reading. I’ve a longstanding interest in Palestine/Israel, and visited there over Easter 2004. If this stuff grabs you too, I urge you to check out the account of that visit, including photos and supporting discussion, over here.]
I think the election success of Hamas in Palestine is a great thing.
Hamas is a terrorist organisation. Let’s make no bones about it – at the highest level it supplies logistical support to attacks against civilian targets. This is completely unacceptable.
Its rhetoric is that of endless war, to be satisfied only with the complete destruction of Israel.
However, the support for terror and rhetoric of violence can easily disguise a more pragmatic appraisal of what Hamas is and what its election means.
Many people have made the comparison of Sinn Fein and the IRA, where involvement in government eventually disenfranchised the armed struggle. I think it’s an appropriate point of reference. It should also be emphasised that Hamas has already been moving on the political track for a while, respecting ceasefires and constructively involving itself in negotiations.
As has been extensively noted (except in the more frothing right-wing outlets), Hamas was not elected for its Islamism or its policy towards Israel, but for its demonstrated achievements in social support throughout Gaza and its appearance as a legitimate alternative to the deeply corrupt Fatah – elements of protest vote and positive support are both at play.
However, it would also be wrong to wave away the Hamas policy towards Israel as unimportant. This policy has now been electorally endorsed, for good or ill.
Hamas’ policy towards Israel is premised on the claim that Israel is an illegal occupier, and they assert the right of armed resistance as a result. This is a claim I have some sympathy with. Armed resistance, of course, does not mean acts of terror against civilians; and moreover, while I accept their right to armed resistance, I do not support such acts – I’m still fundamentally pacifistic, and believe that even in a situation as mired as Palestine that diplomacy is the way forward.
It is in the diplomatic sense that I support Hamas’ militarism. Its belligerent stance towards Israel is a source of focus and pride for many Palestinians, and is a significant bargaining chip in negotiations. Israel (and the US) traditionally welcome Palestine to the bargaining table only in the stance of the defeated – abject and powerless. This, of course, is a diplomatic trap – if such a stance is accepted, then Palestine is only in a position to make concessions, rather than seek them; if it is not accepted, then Israel can claim that it Palestine is not entering into negotiations with sincerity or goodwill or whatever the wash of the day might be. If Hamas lays down its arms, it should only do so in return for a similar, significant, concession from Israel.
(Similarly, the Roadmap To Peace is stalled because Israel demands that Palestine make the first move, even though as the far-stronger partner it by rights should be the one making the first sacrifices; it would be madness, in the face of continuing land confiscation in the West Bank, for Palestine to make itself even weaker in the hopes that Israel will follow through on its promises.)
Hamas has, throughout the intifada, been open to negotiation and diplomacy, its rhetoric notwithstanding. (The division between rhetoric and action is well-appreciated by Israel when it suits its purposes – namely, its accusations that the Palestinian Authority talks of peace but acts destructively. The reverse division is in place here, where a destructive rhetoric disguises a practical engagement with peace negotiations. Unsurprisingly this division is rarely mentioned by Israel, although we can and should hope it is recognised internally.)
Furthermore, I have more faith in the ability of Hamas to represent the people of Palestine than those of the corrupt Fatah. I think this leadership will have a street legitimacy in Palestine that has previously been lacking. Corruption will hardly disappear overnight, as the Palestinian Authority is a larger institution than Fatah and many of its practices and personnel will remain in position through the changeover, but it is certain that much will change. Hamas will almost certainly be more responsive to the needs of Palestinians.
This also works in reverse – if Hamas will be more responsive to the Palestinians, so the massive mandate of support will mean the Palestinian people will be more responsive to their government than they have been for some time. This will pay dividends when the different parties sit around a negotiating table, because Hamas will be able to follow through on promises made more easily than Fatah (while this will make negotiations inevitably more tortuous, as Hamas will not make concessions as lightly as Fatah sometimes did, the fact is that Hamas can back up the talk more than Fatah could. This will in turn restore legitimacy to the peace process in the eyes of Palestinians.)
The way things will develop from here remains unclear. I will be intrigued to watch as Hamas moves into power and begins to make crucial decisions, and, crucially, to watch what Israel does in response (behind the wall of bluster it will certainly maintain to shore up the vote at home). I am optimistic, however, that Hamas in government will find itself pulled towards the centre. The vast majority of Palestinian people are more than ready to negotiate in good faith in order to end the occupation. Numerous vexing questions remain, principally the refugee problem, but there are ways out of the mess. A solid, democratically elected, popularly legitimate representative government of the Palestinian people is a crucial step on this journey.
I sincerely hope I don’t look back on this in a year’s time and shake my head at my foolishness. I have no illusions about how bad this could be – but my best reading of the situation is that this really is a very positive outcome. Let’s hope so.